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Precision agriculture has become a promising paradigm to transform modern agriculture. The recent revolution in big data and Internet-of-Things (IoT) provides unprecedented benefits including optimizing yield, minimizing environmental impact, and reducing cost. However, the mass collection of farm data in IoT applications raises serious concerns about potential privacy leakage that may harm the farmers’ welfare. In this work, we propose a novel scalable and private geo-distance evaluation system, called SPRIDE, to allow application servers to provide geographic-based services by computing the distances among sensors and farms privately. The servers determine the distances without learning any additional information about their locations. The key idea of SPRIDE is to perform efficient distance measurement and distance comparison on encrypted locations over a sphere by leveraging a homomorphic cryptosystem. To serve a large user base, we further propose SPRIDE+ with novel and practical performance enhancements based on pre-computation of cryptographic elements. Through extensive experiments using real-world datasets, we show SPRIDE+ achieves private distance evaluation on a large network of farms, attaining 3+ times runtime performance improvement over existing techniques. We further show SPRIDE+ can run on resource-constrained mobile devices, which offers a practical solution for privacy-preserving precision agriculture IoT applications. 

Autonomous vehicles (AVs), equipped with numerous sensors such as camera, LiDAR, radar, and ultrasonic sensor, are revolutionizing the transportation industry. These sensors are expected to sense reliable information from a physical environment, facilitating the critical decision-making process of the AVs. Ultrasonic sensors, which detect obstacles in a short distance, play an important role in assisted parking and blind spot detection events. However, due to their weak security level, ultrasonic sensors are particularly vulnerable to signal injection attacks, when the attackers inject malicious acoustic signals to create fake obstacles and intentionally mislead the vehicles to make wrong decisions with disastrous aftermath. In this paper, we systematically analyze the attack model of signal injection attacks toward moving vehicles. By considering the potential threats, we propose SoundFence, a physical-layer defense system which leverages the sensors’ signal processing capability without requiring any additional equipment. SoundFence verifies the benign measurement results and detects signal injection attacks by analyzing sensor readings and the physical-layer signatures of ultrasonic signals. Our experiment with commercial sensors shows that SoundFence detects most (more than 95%) of the abnormal sensor readings with very few false alarms, and it can also accurately distinguish the real echo from injected signals to identify injection attacks.